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From Corporate Responsibility to Corporate 
Accountability 
 
Min Yan* and Daoning Zhang** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of corporate responsibility or corporate social 
responsibility (“CSR”) keeps evolving since it appeared. The emphasis was 
first placed on business people’s social conscience rather than on the 
company itself, which was well reflected by Howard Bowen’s landmark 
book, Social Responsibilities of the Businessman.1 Then CSR was defined as 
responsibilities to society, which extends beyond economic and legal 
obligations by corporations.2 Since then, corporate responsibility is thought 
to begin where the law ends. 3  In other words, the concept of social 
responsibility largely excludes legal obedience from the concept of social 
responsibility. An analysis of 37 of the most used definitions of CSR also 
shows “voluntary” as one of the most common dimensions.4 Put differently, 
corporate responsibility reflects the belief that corporations have duties 
beyond generating profits for their shareholders. Such responsibilities 
include: the negative duty to refrain from causing harm to the environment, 
individuals and communities; as well as positive duties to actively engage in 
activities to improve society and environment, for example, protecting 
human rights of workers and communities affected by business activities. 
Although corporate accountability is sometimes used interchangeably 
with corporate responsibility, the concept of corporate accountability is not 
synonymous with corporate responsibility. Corporate responsibility is 
 
 *  Assistant Professor in Business Law, Queen Mary University of London, England; 
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 1.  HOWARD R. BOWEN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BUSINESSMAN 7 (1953). 
2.   See, e.g., JOSEPH W. MCGUIRE, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 144 (1963). 
 3.  Keith Davis, The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities, 16 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 312, 313 (1973); Marcel V. Marrewijk & Marco Werre, Multiple Levels of Corporate 
Sustainability: Between Agency and Communication, 44 J. BUS. ETHICS 107, 107-119 (2003). 
 4.  Alexander Dahlsrud, How Corporate Social Responsibility is Defined: An Analysis of 37 
Definitions, 15 CORP. SOC. RESPONSIB. ENVIRON. MGMT. 1-13 (2008). 
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focusing on voluntary approaches to engage with social/environmental 
issues,5 while corporate accountability is more about the confrontational or 
enforceable framework of influencing corporate behaviour. 6  Corporate 
accountability focuses more on establishing institutional mechanisms that 
hold companies accountable rather than merely urging companies to act 
toward a socially desirable end voluntarily. 7  In this regard, corporate 
accountability could be understood as corporate control—the ability of those 
affected by a corporation to control the corporate behaviour. Despite the 
controversial argument which claims that companies should be controlled by 
society, today’s public companies, especially those large ones with 
enormous social impact, can hardly be seen as entirely private concerns.8 In 
effect, shareholders have lost much of its de jure or de facto control in many 
jurisdictions due to the development of modern corporate law as well as the 
separation between ownership and control.9 
On the ground that voluntary CSR is inadequate to deliver the necessary 
change and to secure more socially responsible activities, corporate 
accountability will continue to grow. Accordingly, pressure exerted by social 
and governmental actors beyond the company itself will influence corporate 
behaviour. Such actors can adopt a wide range of strategies, including, but 
not limited to, the mobilisation of legal mechanisms through reward and 
punishment to enforce social standards. 
This paper will, therefore, propose a framework for corporate 
accountability that focuses on implementing, rather than introducing, rights 
and duties for companies. Accountability could be referred to as “the 
perception of defending or justifying one’s conduct to an audience that has 
reward or sanction authority, and where rewards or sanctions are perceived 
to be contingent upon audience evaluation of such conduct.”10 In order to 
build an enforceable framework for corporate accountability against a wider 
society, it is essential to establish more precise means for sanctioning failure 
amounts to the fundamental element of corporate control. Unlike the 
neoclassical version of corporate accountability (i.e., companies should be 
 
 5.  Davis, supra note 3, at 107. 
 6.  For example, in international relations and public administration literatures, accountability is 
about questioning, directing, sanctioning, or constraining others’ actions. See Kate Macdonald, The 
Meaning and Purposes of Transnational Accountability, 73 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 426, 428 (2014). 
 7.  See Carmen Valor, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards 
Corporate Accountability, 110 BUS. & SOC. REV. 191, 196 (2005). 
 8.  See, e.g., JOHN PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE THEORY 
OF COMPANY LAW 22 (1993) (noting that it is well argued that these large companies are no longer private 
organisations because they have the ability to exercise social decision-making power). 
 9.  See, e.g., MIN YAN, BEYOND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH MAXIMISATION 10 (2018). 
 10.  Danielle Beu & M. Ronald Buckley, The Hypothesized Relationship between Accountability 
and Ethical Behaviour, 34 J. BUS. ETHICS 57, 61 (2001). 
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accountable only to shareholders), 11  actors other than shareholders can 
sanction corporate results based on the existing institutional framework if the 
concept of corporate accountability can be adopted. One typical example is 
where market participants are able to sanction or constrain corporate 
behaviour through market mechanisms. However, due to the inadequacy of 
market forces, or failure of the market, as will be discussed in the next 
section, multilayers of disciplines are required for a workable corporate 
accountability framework. In particular, the law’s ability to frame such an 
accountability framework becomes extremely important. 
Studies have already provided abundant empirical evidence on the 
significant role of different stakeholders on CSR-related activities.12 This 
paper will, as a result, focus on how the primary stakeholder groups, whose 
continuing participation is essential to the survival of the company as a going 
concern,13 can enforce and ensure corporate accountability through the law 
under the existing institutional framework. It is important to note that this 
paper mainly focuses on irresponsible corporate behaviour that does not 
necessarily breach the mandatory law. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II critically 
discusses how market discipline ensures corporate accountability. Section III 
examines how the primary stakeholder groups, including shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, community, and creditors, can potentially 
employ the existing legal mechanisms14 to ensure corporate accountability 
even when a company’s conduct remains in compliance with the law. Section 
IV then discusses regulations in general, serving as side constraint, and 
improving the bottom line for corporate behaviour. Section V provides some 
concluding remarks at the end. 
 
II. MARKET MECHANISM 
 
The contemporary CSR with an essentially voluntary nature has 
intellectual roots in neoliberal economics. Neoliberalism as a new economic 
orthodoxy advocates: “new forms of political-economic governance 
 
 11.  Shareholders are neither the sole residual claimant nor the sole residual risk taker. See, e.g., Min 
Yan, Agency Theory Re-examined: An Agency Relationship and Residual Claimant Perspective, 26 INT'L  
COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL L. REV. 139, 140 (2015). 
 12.  See, e.g., Jedrzej George Frynas & Camila Yamahaki, Corporate Social Responsibility: Review 
and Roadmap of Theoretical Perspectives, 25 BUS. ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. 258, 266 (2016). 
 13.  Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92, 106 (1995) (noting that although there are different categories 
of primary stakeholder groups, it generally includes shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, the 
community, the government, and the environment). 
 14.  For example, using competition law, corporate law, insolence law, contract law, and tort law as 
a binding force to hold companies accountable. 
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premised on the extension of market relationships[.]”15 Free markets are 
consequently treated as the best way to ensure the most efficient allocation 
of resources, hence the maximization of wealth and welfare. 16 
Unsurprisingly, corporate control by a society under neoliberalism can only 
occur through the market; namely, only the market can sanction non-
compliance or failures. 
Market forces include product market discipline, capital market 
discipline, and labour market discipline, which are also used under the 
conventional corporate responsibility framework to justify or incentivise 
companies to behave responsibly. The assumption is that the product, capital, 
and labour markets will influence corporate behaviour by penalizing poor 
performers (i.e., social irresponsibility) and rewarding good ones (i.e., social 
responsibility). 
First, in the product market, or say consumer market, consumer 
boycotts are the most visible and acute means of product market response.17 
A more generalized form of product market response is ethical purchase 
behaviour, namely, to purchase products according to the manufacturer’s 
reputation for socially responsible conduct. A positive reputation may 
encourage consumers to decide to purchase, while a negative reputation 
would likely make consumers avoid the product. Empirical studies show that 
increasing numbers of consumers are prepared to spend more on ethical 
goods.18 Second, investors in the capital market could also prima facie affect 
corporate behaviour via investment policy.19 The rapid growth of socially 
responsible investment (“SRI”) funds are a good example that reflects how 
the capital market could ensure accountability. For instance, by the end of 
2017, the market size of SRI in the U.S. was over $12.0 trillion, a quarter of 
all investments under professional management in the U.S.20 Investors take 
 
15.  Wendy Larner, Neo-liberalism, Policy, Ideology, Governmentality, 63 STUDIES IN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 5, 5 (2000). 
 16.  See PADDY IRELAND & RENGINEE G. PILLAY, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE 85 (Peter Utting et al. eds., 2010). 
 17.  See N. Craig Smith, Morality and the Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate 
Accountability, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 881 (1991). 
 18. See, e.g., ANDREW CRANE & DIRK MATTEN, BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE: 
MANAGING CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (3d ed. 
2003); see also Marylyn Carrigan, Isabelle Szmigin & Joanne Wright, Shopping for a Better World? An 
Interpretive Study of the Potential for Ethical Consumption within the Older Market, 21 JOURNAL OF 
CONSUMER MARKETING 401, 401-17 (2004). 
 19.  See Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create 
Social Value, 44 JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW 205 (2019).  
 20.  See Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends, The Forum for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 2018, https://www.ussif.org/trends; see also Adam Connaker & 
Saadia Madsbjerg, The State of Socially Responsible Investing, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 17, 2019, 
https://hbr.org/2019/01/the-state-of-socially-responsible-investing. 
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social (and environmental) performance into consideration and divest in 
socially irresponsible companies, which in turn creates adverse effects on the 
share price. Third, companies in the labour market with poor reputations will 
find it more difficult or costly to recruit and retain employees, while images 
of responsible companies will have a positive impact on employees’ morale 
and productivity. 
A company is, to a large extent, an economic entity. This determines it 
has to survive in the market first of all. Different markets could accordingly 
affect and discipline corporate behaviour. However, one should not overlook 
the weakness of market discipline. For the product market, ethical 
considerations may easily be outweighed by conventional product attributes, 
such as quality, value for money, and service.21 Meanwhile, the scope of 
issues attracting high levels of consumer interest is limited.22  Empirical 
evidence further suggests that consumers are selectively ethical. 23 
Sometimes there could be a boycott against products made by irresponsible 
firms, but such momentum is normally difficult to sustain. For those non-
consumer-oriented companies (i.e., not selling directly into consumer 
markets and hence, not brand sensitive) or those with monopolistic powers, 
the disciplinary pressure from the product market is also understandably 
inadequate. 
In the capital market, ethical investment and SRI funds remain small 
compared to the size of the entire equity market. More importantly, there will 
always be socially-neutral buyers for shares in companies that ethical funds 
reject, which implies that their share price and cost of capital will be 
unaffected by the irresponsibility. 24  The crucial question is whether 
institutional investors would be ready to permit or encourage their investee 
companies to work on their social performance if it were to the companies’ 
 
       21.  See Roger Cowe & Simon William, Who are the Ethical Consumers?, THE CO-OPERATIVE 
BANK, 2000, at 2. 
 22. For example, child labour, sweatshops, genetically modified organism and environmental issues 
are more likely to attract consumers’ attention, but consumers may be insensitive to some wider 
employment issues, such as gender equality, due to their very nature. In other words, some ethical 
concerns are to a lesser degree expressed in consumers’ buying behaviour. Moreover, although there was 
a high awareness of high-profile companies’ socially irresponsible behaviours, awareness was generally 
low in relation to ethical behaviours. See, e.g., id. at 11-12.  
 23. Marylyn Carrigan and Ahmad Attalla, The Myth of the Ethical Consumer: Do Ethics Matter in 
Purchase Behaviour? 18 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER MARKETING 560-577 (2001) (arguing that consumers’ 
purchase behaviour is not always influenced by their social criteria). There is also empirical evidence 
showing that social responsibility was not an important consideration in consumers’ purchasing 
behaviours. See id. at 565. 
 24. See EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER: A TWENTIETH CENTURY 
FUND STUDY 269 (1981); Brest, Gilson & Wolfson, supra note 19, at 14 (“[A]ny premium in the valuation 
of shares that results from socially-motivated investors clamoring to own them presents an opportunity 
for socially-neutral bargain-hunters to profit from selling shares that overprices.”). 
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financial detriment. The collective action problem and conflicts of interest 
would inevitably lead to a general reluctance of institutional investors to 
intervene in their investee companies’ internal affairs, though they are 
encouraged to be more actively involved. 
It is argued that “[leaving] corporate control in the hands of the market 
is a political decision that could be reversed, and should be reversed when 
evidence shows that markets are not successfully changing corporate 
practices.”25 In short, markets can discipline corporate behaviour to some 
degree but not always sufficiently,26 hence, other disciplinary mechanisms 
are urgently needed to ensure corporate accountability. 
 
III. LEGAL MECHANISM 
 
Law has an important role to play in restraining corporate behaviour 
through its reward and sanction system. In fact, many CSR-related issues 
concerning the environment, health, and safety, are already regulated by the 
law.27 The challenge here is how to use legal mechanisms to make companies 
accountable even when they do not violate the existing law and how primary 
stakeholder groups could enforce accountability. 
The first part of this section discusses tort law, which bears a close 
connection to corporate responsibility and explores the possibility for 
victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour to use tort law as a weapon 
against the wrongdoer. The second part discusses the potential of 
competition law to be used by customers and other market participants, such 
as competitors holding companies accountable for their behaviour. The third 
part examines the role of contract law in ensuring accountability by 
transforming voluntary commitments into enforceable obligations, such as 
in a supply chain. This part also explores whether employees and other 
relevant third parties could use contract law to enforce a company’s 
voluntary CSR commitments. The fourth part discusses how companies can 
provide both shareholders and non-shareholding stakeholders opportunities 
to affect corporate accountability. Last but not least, the fifth part focuses on 
both voluntary and involuntary creditors, including tort victims using 
insolvency law to hold companies accountable for their behaviour. 
 
 25. Carmen Valor, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Citizenship: Towards Corporate 
Accountability, 110 BUS. &  SOC.  REV. 191, 201 (2005). 
26.  Companies are, as a result, “likely to fulfill their responsibility in a minimalist and fragmented 
fashion.” Peter Utting et al. eds., Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development, UNRISD 
Report for Geneva 90 (2000). Moreover, empirical evidence also shows “good” companies do not 
necessarily prosper and “bad” companies do not necessarily lose out. See id. at 70. 
 27. JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LIMITATIONS 
AND OPPORTUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2006).  
2 - YAN _ZHANG - V9 - KC - 10.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019 11:11 AM 
Winter 2020] CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 49 
A. TORT LAW 
 
CSR-related issues, such as safety and health protection for workers and 
environmental protection, bear a close connection to tort law.28 When Eilbert 
and Parket attempted to define CSR, they argued the best way to understand 
social responsibility is to think of it as “good neighbourliness.” 29  This 
concept involves two phases. First, it means not doing things that spoil the 
neighbourhood. Second, it can be expressed as the voluntary assumption of 
the obligation to help solve neighbourhood problems.30 In this regard, the 
neighbour principle in tort law is helpful in ensuring corporate accountability 
across the industry. 
Lord Atkin famously said in Donoghue v. Stevenson that “the rule that 
you are to love your neighbour becomes in law . . . You must take reasonable 
care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be 
likely to injure your neighbour . . .” 31 Regarding corporate behaviour, it 
could undoubtedly affect our society in many different ways, so a company 
should take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which it can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure any part of the society. This is 
not inconsistent with Waddock’s view, which is that “companies need to 
assume responsibility for the impacts of their practices and processes and the 
decision that stands behind those practices[.]”32  
It would be easier to hold companies accountable for their behaviour by 
adopting the tools of tort law. A company will have a duty to change its 
behaviour or adopt preventative measures if a reasonable person would have 
foreseen acts that would affect other parties (i.e., the likelihood of injury). If 
the company fails to do so, which in turn causes any harm to other members 
of the society, then the victims or their representatives would be allowed to 
sue the company for damages. 
Tort law can be relied upon to provide extra help to victims even though 
there is no physical or legal proximity between the alleged companies and 
the victims. Especially in the context of group companies, a parent company 
can be held liable for harm caused to the employees of its subsidiaries, 
despite the principle of corporate separate personality. In other words, a 
subsidiary company’s employee who is a tort victim, can possibly claim that 
the parent company owes a duty of care to her and thereby seek recourse 
 
28.  See ANDREAS RÜHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL 
SUPPLY Chains 164 (Janet Dine et al. eds., 2015). 
 29.  Henry Eilbert & I. Robert Parket, The Current Status of Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 
BUS. HORIZONS 4, 7 (1973). 
 30.  See id. at 7. 
 31.  Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (U.K.) (emphasis added). 
32.   SANDRA WADDOCK, LEADING CORPORATE CITIZENS 219 (1st ed. 2002).  
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through tort law remedies. 33  For multinational companies, it becomes 
possible for local victims of unsound safety and health policies, 
environmental pollution, and human right infringement, to consider 
litigation abroad in the state of the parent companies.34 
One good example is the innovative use of the U.S. Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”). 35  This statute is used to hold companies accountable for their 
breaches of duties of human rights protection, environmental protection, or 
employees’ welfare. It allows a non-U.S. citizen to sue a company, which 
commits a wrong to the person based on treaties under international law or 
norms under international customary law.36 Since domestic law may include 
treaties and norms under international customary law, the U.S. gains 
jurisdiction to hear a wide range of tort law cases.37 As a result, multinational 
companies may have direct liability to certain victims under ATS. However, 
after a recent case, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co,38 the U.S. Supreme 
Court curbs the universal jurisdiction by requiring tort claims to touch and 
concern U.S. territory. When these claims do not, the ATS remains a viable 
alternative to redress for tort victims. 
Tort law in other jurisdictions can also potentially work as a weapon for 
victims of human rights infringement or environmental pollution. Besides 
general tort law doctrines, such as negligence, special forms of tort 
regulation may help reduce the evidential burden for victims. Take product 
liability, a unique form of tort, for example. Under Part I of the U.K. 
Consumer Protection Act of 1987, traders may be subject to strict liability 
whereby aggrieved consumers can sue traders producing faulty products 
without needing to prove manufacturer negligence. 
In short, due to the duty of care companies owe to the general public to 
avoid causing them harm, victims of irresponsible corporate behaviour could 
choose to turn to tort law to hold such companies accountable. 
 
 
 
33.   See, e.g., Chandler v. Cape plc, [2012] E.W.C.A. Civ 525 (explaining that a party company may 
owe a duty of care to its employees and its subsidiaries, despite subsidiaries being separate legal persons, 
where it failed to provide a secure work environment to employees exposed to asbestos).  
 34.  See LIESBETH ENNEKING, FOREIGN DIRECT LIABILITY AND BEYOND: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF 
TORT LAW IN PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
44 (A.G. Castermans et al., eds., 2012). 
 35.  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
36.   Liesbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International 
Relevance of the Dutch Shell Nigeria Case, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 44 (2014).  
 37.  See Erenest A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-
Law Litigation after Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1049 (2015). 
 38.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
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B. COMPETITION AND UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 
 
The main objective of competition law at a macro-level is to protect the 
freedom of consumers to make informed choices and maintain free-market 
competition. In addition to antitrust rules, there are also rules governing 
unfair commercial practices to protect customers from detrimental effects, 
such as unfair competition at a micro-level.39 
The U.S. case Kasky v. Nike40 discussed below is an excellent example 
of how competition law can be used to hold companies that conduct unfair 
commercial practices accountable. Nike had been actively writing press 
releases, sending letters to newspapers, athletic directors, and university 
administrations, since the early 1990s, claiming that workers in Nike 
factories were well treated. In 1997, an employee of Nike leaked a 
confidential audit prepared by Ernest and Young about Nike’s sweatshop 
and labour practices in Southeast Asia. 41  The leaked audit showed that 
Nike’s statements in these press releases and letters were either false or 
misleading. In 1998, Marc Kasky, an activist in California, brought a lawsuit 
against Nike for unfair and deceptive practices (i.e., issuing false or 
misleading statements to the people of California); specifically, the lawsuit 
alleged Nike violated labour practices under California’s Unfair Competition 
Law and False Advertising Law.42 The case was finally settled out of court, 
with Nike paying $1.5 million to the Fair Labor Association.43 
It is clear from Nike that voluntary CSR reports and codes of conduct 
may have legal repercussions. Put it differently, companies can continue to 
 
 39.  On the macro-level, the competition law strives to maintain fair competition among competitors 
so that efficient firms are chosen by the customers and, at the same time, the social welfare that arises 
from the competition, is maximised. On the micro-level, it aims to guarantee that customers can obtain a 
fair share of such maximisation of overall social welfare; a dominant seller in the market may, therefore, 
have a special responsibility to not abuse its position at the expense of customers’ welfare. See BERT 
KEIRSBILCK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LAW OF UNFAIR COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND COMPETITION LAW 
540 (2011). The latter part of the law bears close connection to intellectual property (“IP”) law. As in 
many cases, unfair commercial practices may involve infringement of IP rights. See also DAMIEN 
GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-FARRAR & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 20-22 (1st 
ed. 2012). 
 40.  Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002) [hereinafter Nike]. 
41.   The audit stated that workers in the Nike factory were exposed to toxic chemicals without 
protection, subjected to physical, verbal and sexual abuse, forced to work illegal excess overtime without 
proper pay, and suffered from poor ventilation and lack of drinking water. Most people in the factories 
were women under the age of 24. See id. at 947. 
42.  California consumer-protection law that allows one person to sue a company on behalf of all  
the people of California for consumer-protection violations. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (2019). 
Id. at 962. 
43.  The settlement also involved investments by Nike to strengthen workplace monitoring and 
factory worker programmes. See Lisa Girion, Nike Settles Lawsuit Over Labor Claims, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
13, 2003), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-sep-13-fi-nike13-story.html. 
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tell their stories, but they need to be more careful that what they say is 
accurate. Businesses will find that they may also be held legally liable for 
their voluntary disclosure (among other voluntary initiatives). Any voluntary 
declarations or disclosures may turn out to have legal implications.44 
Apart from public enforcement,45 private parties can lodge complaints 
as an indirect means to initiate an investigation of anti-competitive activities, 
unfair commercial practices, or initiate litigation to claim a breach of contract 
in terms of an infringement of competition law.46 For example, a market 
participant can claim compensation by initiating a petition under articles 101 
and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
against companies who abuse their market position in a national court.47 
Consumers and competitors can also choose to complain to relevant national 
competition authorities or the European Commission to seek remedies under 
the E.U. antitrust law, for example. 
In the U.K., the introduction of the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations (“CPUT”) 48  was a response to the E.U. Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (“UCPD”)49. When customers believe that 
they are the victims of unfair commercial practices conducted by traders, 
they can sue the traders based on a new amendment of CPUT; i.e., § 1(3) of 
the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations of 2014.50 For example, 
when a company fails to keep its word that it promised in its code of conduct, 
its behaviour may amount to a misleading action under regulation 5(3)(b) of 
CPUT. 
Accordingly, consumers, who have contracts with traders, are able to 
sue traders and require a full or partial repayment of the price of goods and/or 
services; provided that traders are or ought to have been aware of their 
misleading behaviours, that are likely to change the average consumers 
decisions regarding whether to buy products from the traders. 51  Unless 
 
44.  Anna Beckers, Legalization Under the Premises of Globalization: Why and Where to Enforce 
Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 24, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., 15, 23 (2017) (providing a 
related example here: the E.U. Consumer Sales Directive Article 2(d) imposes a duty on sellers of goods 
whereby they need to comply with public statements with regard to the characteristics of their goods). 
       45.  Given the nature of the anti-competitive practices, public enforcement by public authorities are 
frequently the main solution to deal with competition law cases. DAMIEN GERADIN, ANNE LAYNE-
FARRAR & NICOLAS PETIT, EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS 322, 324-27 (1st ed. 2012). 
46.  See JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 754 (10th ed. 2014). 
       47.  MICHAEL.J. FRESE, SANCTIONS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE  4 (2012). 
The author points out that public bodies may also commence public enforcement through a European 
competition network within the E.U. Id. at 15. Similarly, article 11 of the E.U. Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices opens the door for both administrative enforcement and private law solutions. Id. 
48.  Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, SI 2008/1277 (U.K.). 
49.  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005, SI 2005/29/EC. 
50.  The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/870 (U.K.). 
       51.  Id. at Part 4A. 
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consumers would like to claim damages arising from inconvenience or 
certain financial expenses at more than the value of the products, consumers 
have nearly no burden to prove trader faults, such as dishonesty, negligence, 
or their losses.52 The strict liabilities imposed on the traders would have a 
far-reaching impact regarding their promises to the public. 53  Therefore, 
regulations such as CPUT can offer consumers an edge that is not otherwise 
available under traditional common law. 
The UCPD regulates communication between companies and 
customers.54 It is worth noting that communication-related responsibilities 
may also be a part of CSRs, as companies frequently prescribe beyond-law 
responsibilities like human rights, environment, and consumer protection in 
their codes of conduct. Apart from the reputation damage caused by 
breaching of these promises, in some cases, companies are also legally liable 
to customers for misleading communication. Therefore, for those 
traditionally voluntary duties provided by companies’ codes of conduct, 
which are implemented and made available to the public, consumers can 
potentially sue companies for their breach if the codes materially influence 
the consumers’ transactional behaviours. In other words, failure to keep 
these promises in certain situations may amount to misleading 
communication. 
 
C. CONTRACT LAW 
 
Following the idea behind the foregoing competition law control, 
another viable mechanism to ensure accountability is to transform voluntary 
commitments into legally enforceable obligation. For example, a company 
could increasingly include CSR commitments into the terms and conditions 
in contracts with their suppliers to formalize CSR commitments as legal 
obligations.55 It is also possible to require external suppliers to adopt CSR 
codes of conduct via legal mechanisms, such as procurement contracts, to 
ensure accountability. 
Of course, other contractual techniques could also be used to make CSR 
enforceable, such as perpetual clauses. Through a perpetual clause, one party 
 
52.  Id. at Part 4A(27J). 
53.  See Misleading and Aggressive Commercial Practices: New Private Rights For Consumers, 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 10 (2018). 
       54.  Anna Beckers, The Regulation of Market Communication and Market Behaviour: Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the Directives on Unfair Commercial Practices and Unfair Contract Terms, 54 
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 475, 481-83 (2017). 
55.  See DOREEN MCBARNET, AURORA VOICULESCU & TOM CAMPBELL, THE NEW CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (2007); see also ANNA BECKERS, 
ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND 
NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 48 (Hugh Collins et al., eds. 2015). 
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may require another to impose duties on the latter’s suppliers to meet the 
same standards or terms so that the same clause will bind all upstream or 
downstream parties.56 However, the success of this mechanism depends on 
the bargaining power. 
Promises made by companies in codes of conduct may add economic 
value to each company through fostering mutual trust and long-term 
relationships, which is a reasonable justification for companies to keep their 
own words. Failure to comply may not only result in unfair commercial 
practices, as explained earlier but misrepresentation, as well. 57  Also, 
equitable doctrines, such as promissory estoppel, could further stop 
companies from reneging on their promises. For instance, suppliers and 
employees may be committed to deliver high-quality goods or services to 
companies and make firm-specific investments based on companies’ CSR 
commitments. Stakeholders who detrimentally rely upon a company’s words 
deserve more protection and may have a claim against the company.58 
It is also worth noting that many jurisdictions allow third parties to 
enforce contract terms even if they are not a party.59 Contract law could 
potentially give contracting parties at both the domestic and international 
level the power to provide third parties enforceable rights.60 This power 
overrides the limitation brought by the privity of contract and potentially 
enables third parties to monitor the implementation of CSR-related promises 
made by companies. 
A good attempt is in Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., where the defendant 
Wal-Mart wrote a code of conduct into its contract with suppliers that 
required suppliers to comply with all relevant employee protection standards 
and improve their work environment.61 Later, it turned out that Wal-Mart 
disregarded its promises and continued to purchase goods from suppliers 
who did not meet these standards.62 The question was whether overseas 
workers, who claimed themselves to be third-party beneficiaries, were 
entitled to sue Wal-Mart with recourse through contract law.63 Under the U.S. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the promise should flow from promisor 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory 
Standards in Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 89 (2014). 
 57.  See Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 
Invisible Handshake, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 925, 928 (1985). 
58.  See Eric Mills Holmes, The Four Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 45, 78 
(1996). 
 59. See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (c. 31). 
 60. See Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory Standards 
in Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 90 (2014). 
61.  Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007 WL 5975664 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (unreported). 
       62.  See id. at 1-2. 
       63.  See id. at 3. 
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A to the third-party beneficiary rather than from promisee B to the third-
party.64 In this case, without sufficient evidence to show Wal-Mart made a 
contractually-binding promise to workers, the lawyers of overseas workers 
argued that it was the intent of promisee, i.e., suppliers, to protect overseas 
workers’ interest.65 Although the court did not support this argument,66 its 
potential cannot be dismissed. 
 
D. CORPORATE LAW 
 
Directors’ duty may be required by corporate law to not only focus on 
shareholder interests but also broader social and environmental issues when 
making corporate decisions.67 If directors’ fiduciary duties to a company 
could be redefined in a way to cover the interests of various stakeholders, 
then a more accountable decision-making process can be expected. For 
example, the U.K. Companies Act of 2006 mandates directors to regard 
stakeholders’ interests, including employees, communities, and others, when 
promoting the long-term interests of the company. Currently, stakeholders 
other than shareholders do not have a say in internal corporate governance 
systems68 or external litigation processes (e.g., directive actions). Setting out 
a list of specific factors requiring consideration can at least “expand the 
grounds for judicial review of directors’ decision-making[.]”69 
Shareholders could, of course, engage through proposals and their 
voting power. They could file CSR-related shareholder proposals at annual 
general meetings, which would constitute a formal and visible signal of 
shareholders’ discontent about a specific social or environmental issue.70 
Such visible signals may be consistent with the logic behind SRI funds, 
which is driven by financial concerns—associated with traditional 
shareholders’ interests—or by investors’ social and environmental moral 
 
       64.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981). 
       65.  Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (2009). 
 66. Id. 
 67. The distinction between the shareholder interests and wider society’s interests is important as 
conflicts are sometimes inevitable. See, e.g., Min Yan, The Corporate Objective Revisited: Part II, 38 
BUS. L. REV. 55, 60 (2017). 
 68. For example, a possible solution to further increase corporate accountability to society is to allow 
representatives of main stakeholder groups to sit in the board meetings. 
69.  GEOFFREY MORSE, PALMER’S COMPANY LAW ¶ 8.2613 (2019); see also Jingchen Zhao, 
Promoting More Socially Responsible Corporations Through a Corporate Law Regulatory Framework, 
37 LEGAL STUDIES 103 (2017). 
 70.  See Parthiban David, M. Bloom & Amy J. Hillman, Investor Activism, Managerial 
Responsiveness, and Corporate Social Performance, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. JOURNAL 91 (2007); Erin M. 
Reid, and Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of 
Climate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. JOURNAL 1157 (2009). 
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principles. 71  However, shareholder activism could be both positive and 
negative. It is not uncommon for activist shareholders to use the same 
strategies to press directors to push share prices, even at the expense of other 
corporate constituents. 
In addition to the role played by directors and shareholders, sufficient, 
reliable, and timely information disclosure can also be employed under the 
company law to ensure accountability. 72  Information disclosure can be 
utilised as a part of company law mechanism to all relevant stakeholder 
groups as to how the company has performed. Take the revised U.K. 
Companies Act of 2006, for example. The new Chapter 4A of Part 12, in 
replacing § 417 “Directors’ Report,” requires directors of a company to 
prepare a “Strategic Report,” including information relating to environ-
mental matters and employee matters. 73  Further details about societal, 
community, and human rights issues, as well as the effectiveness of any 
company policies concerning those matters, is required to be disclosed in 
cases of listed companies.74 
Although reporting itself does not prescribe a change in the underlying 
corporate behaviour and force corporations to be more accountable, it can 
strengthen the market forces. As Schwartz and Carroll pointed out, “[for] 
there to be real accountability, [a] business must engage in a process of 
providing sufficient, accurate, timely, and verifiable disclosure of all of its 
activities (e.g., through auditing and reporting) when such activities might 
affect others.”75 Apart from stimulating and strengthening public pressure on 
corporations to improve their social and environmental performance, the so-
called “greenwashing” or “window-dressing risk” can also be mitigated by 
increased transparency and comprehensive information because customers 
and other members of the society could more easily assess and compare 
corporate social performance.76 A clearly defined mandatory CSR reporting 
framework would at least prevent corporations from providing selective 
information or solely concentrating on positive aspects.77 Such a framework 
 
 71.  See Maria L. Goranova and Lori V. Ryan, Shareholder Activism: A Multidisciplinary Review, 
40 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 1230-1268 (2014); Yan, supra note 9, at 98-109. 
 72.  See, e.g., Min Yan, Corporate Social Responsibility vs. Shareholder Value Maximization: 
Through the Lens of Hard and Soft Law, 40 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS (2019). Sufficient, reliable, and timely 
information disclosure may be regulated by securities law in some countries.  
       73.  U.K. Companies Act 2006 §§ 414A, 414C. 
       74.  Id. at § 414C. 
 75.  Mark S. Schwartz & Archie B. Carroll, Integrating and Unifying Competing and 
Complementary Frameworks: The Search for a Common Core in the Business and Society Field, 47 BUS. 
& SOC’Y 148, 171 (2008). 
 76.  See Yan, supra note 72. 
 77.  Apparently, mandatorily required reporting may be more effective in ensuring the corporate 
accountability, but it should be equally borne in mind that disclosure cannot guarantee the success of non-
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could also help to establish an atmosphere for businesses to pay more 
attention to their impact on the environment, society, and other issues. After 
establishing such a reporting framework, directors and managers with better 
information about the effects of their corporate activities might then 
voluntarily adopt higher standards.78  
 
E. INSOLVENCY LAW 
 
Multiple values and public policies need to be weighed upon for a meta-
law, such as insolvency law. A company’s responsibility to society also plays 
an important role in the insolvency law context. 79  Non-shareholding 
stakeholders can use insolvency law to protect their interests and hold 
companies accountable for their behaviour. It is the main objective for 
insolvency laws to pursue various values, including preserving jobs, 
protecting stakeholders other than creditors, and protecting local community 
interests.80 
To begin, creditors can protect themselves by initiating a creditors’ 
voluntary winding-up procedure or applying to courts to initiate a 
compulsory winding-up procedure. A positive account of insolvency law 
provides that it distributes losses incurred from debtors’ default by 
considering creditors’ respective abilities to bear losses and risks.81  The 
 
mandatory initiatives. 
 78.  John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: 
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 32 (2003). 
 79.  For example, certain banks are said to be too big to fail as their failure may give rise to systemic 
risks to the whole state or beyond. See Kinga Bauer & Joanna Krasodomska, Social Responsibility of 
Organizations: Directions of Changes, 387 PUBL’G HOUSE OF WROCŁAW U. OF ECON. 11, 26 (2015). 
 80.  See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 153, 577 (1998) 
(noting that some insolvency law scholars, who are called “traditionalists,” believe that economic value 
is not the only value that insolvency law should pursue; they believe other stakeholders’ interests should 
also be respected); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 764 (1991). 
 81.  For example, certain employees, besides managers, do not have access to financial information 
of the company so they have difficulties in predicting the risks of the company where they are working. 
The employees also suffer severe hardship when they lose their jobs and, as a result, their incomes. 
Furthermore, employees are not experts in shielding their risks, and rarely do they have more than one 
job to spread out the risk of a layoff. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777, 
790 (1987). Further, Korobkin argued that the reason why companies internalize employees is to reduce 
the cost, as employees may accept a remuneration lower than market value. They may expect other 
informal benefits from the company, such as a promotion. When a company is wound up, the direct effect 
to the employees, among other things, is their reliance on savings and that it is difficult for them to 
immediately find another job. Bankruptcy law was described as “dirty complex elastic and interconnected 
policies.” Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12 
(1996); see also Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 717, 766 (1991). 
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availability of the right to make a petition to liquidate a company gives 
creditors, and other possible parties, leverage to protect themselves. 
Tort victims and employees, among other voluntary and non-voluntary 
creditors, will equally participate in the framework of negotiating whether 
certain protective mechanisms—not limited to absolute priority, cross-class 
cram-down mechanism, and fair and equitable doctrine—are ignored or 
misused by liquidators and administrators.82 In other words, when mulling 
over a reorganisation plan, creditors can protect their rights by fastening the 
consciences of administrators and liquidators, who, in turn, investigate the 
business conduct of the insolvent companies. Furthermore, insolvency law 
makes companies accountable to tort creditors, who are either employees or 
victims of faulty products or pollution. Though those contingent creditors’ 
debts will mature and due in the future, their debts are still recognised by 
insolvency proceedings. 83  For instance, in a famous mass tort case, the 
Johns-Manville Corporation had to file a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding due to 
its significant tort liabilities arising from exposing its employees to 
asbestos.84 The court appointed a legal representative for victims who had 
yet to be identified and asked the company to set up a trust fund to settle 
future potential claims.85 
Stakeholders are also passively protected by miscellaneous tools under 
insolvency law. In the U.K., for example, corporate reorganization 
proceedings require administrators, who are the officers of courts, to rescue 
a company to protect a broad range of stakeholders.86 It is clear that the 
priority of administration is to rescue the insolvent companies themselves, 
as opposed to the interests of some secured creditors; only when this goal 
cannot be achieved, administrators may consider other objectives, such as 
achieving a better result than winding-up for all creditors. 87  Another 
important aspect of the reform of insolvency law was that insolvency law 
ring-fenced a prescribed portion of assets of a debtor on behalf of unsecured 
creditors. As a result, assets subject to floating charges are available to 
unsecured creditors to the extent arranged by this “prescribed part 
requirement.” This means that secured floating charge holders have to give 
up a percentage of debtor companies’ assets for the sake of a wide range of 
unsecured creditors. Insolvency law also provides certain weak categories of 
 
 82.  See Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990). 
 83.  See Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435, 1443 (2004). 
 84.  In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986). 
 85.  See Listokin and Ayotte, supra note 83, at 1443.  
 86.  See Insolvency Act 1986 (c. 45), Schedule B1 § 3 (U.K.).  
 87.  See id. at § 3(1)(a). 
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creditors with preferential creditor status,88 including employees’ wages.89 
The law makes clear that the liquidator, administrator, or receiver “shall 
make a prescribed part of the company’s net property available for the 
satisfaction of unsecured debts.”90 
Under certain circumstances, courts would allow stakeholders to sue 
debtors to seek relief. 91  Secured creditors who are unable to be fully 
protected by insolvency proceedings can seek a lift of stay and take further 
actions, as long as the purpose of administration will not be frustrated.92 Such 
design shows that it remains possible for private enforcement to be 
conducted within insolvency proceedings so that creditors can protect 
themselves and make the debtor companies accountable for their conduct. 
Public authorities other than courts may also play a role under 
insolvency law, generally based on public interest protection. 93  These 
authorities can punish companies that conduct illegal businesses, such as 
Ponzi schemes, illegal lotteries, or insurance contracts.94  
In short, insolvency laws of many countries require companies to 
consider stakeholders’ interests.95 Breach of these obligations can lead to 
remedies clearly prescribed by insolvency law. 
 
IV. MULTILAYERS OF ENFORCEMENT 
 
A traditional way to ensure accountability is to use mandatory laws to 
control companies’ negative externalities by elevating the social and 
environmental bottom lines. 96  For example, the regulatory regimes for 
consumer protection laws, employment laws, anti-discrimination laws, 
 
 88.  Preferential debts include contributions to occupational pension schemes, remuneration of 
employees, levies on coal and steel production, and so on. See Insolvency Act 1986 § 386 (U.K.). 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See id. at § 176. 
 91.  In Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, [1990] B.C.C. 859, (866) (appeal taken from Ch. Court) 
(U.K.). Although the general rule is that litigations against insolvent companies are normally not allowed 
in administration and liquidation proceedings, creditors may, subject to the discretion of the court, require 
the court to life the moratorium and seek individual remedies. See, e.g., Insolvency Act 1986, sch. B1, § 
43(7) (U.K.). 
92.  In Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc, [1990] B.C.C. 859, 879 (appeal taken from Ch. Court) 
(U.K.).  
       93.  See, e.g., Insolvency Act 1986, § 124 (U.K.). 
94.  See DERECK FRENCH, MAYSON, FRENCH & RYAN ON COMPANY LAW 597 (2018). 
       95. Take the 1986 U.K. Insolvency Act, for example. Under the Sch B1 § 3, the purpose of 
administration proceedings is to rescue the whole insolvent company on behalf of all stakeholders. 
96.  There is an emerging body of literature on regulating CSR. See, e.g., Adedayo L. Abah, Legal 
Regulation of CSR: The Case of Social Media and Gender-Based Harassment, 5 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & 
ETHICS 38 (2016); Onyeka Osuji, Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The Multinational Corporate 
Corruption Example, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 31 (2011). 
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environmental protection laws, and so on, are about requiring corporations 
not to harm the society through banning certain behaviour. It can either 
involve public enforcement, where regulations confer investigative power to 
authorities and allow them to punish certain business activities; or offer new 
remedies to private parties and enable them to seek remedies by suing 
companies under certain circumstances.97 
Elevating the minimum voluntary obligations of corporations to the 
level of obligatory duties by providing incentives/disincentives through the 
threat of liability can fill the governance void. Although mandatory 
minimum standards may account for only a small portion of the entire set of 
mechanisms meant to hold companies accountable, they are undoubtedly at 
the core of the overall framework of control. As a result, companies will 
either proactively or passively change their original business conduct to 
comply with the mandatory requirements. When some parts of originally 
voluntary CSRs become legally enforceable under the accountability 
regimes, the states are then able to learn from the processes of 
implementation and the results achieved.98 As a result, the states’ ability to 
regulate social, environmental, and economic affairs can also be improved, 
which would further encourage them to advance development more justly.99 
Nevertheless, the regulatory gap has some limitations. First, the 
hysteresis nature of the laws and legislative processes are self-evident. It 
takes time for legislators and policymakers to react to new sources of harm. 
Secondly, according to Armour and Gordon, the “regulatory slack,”100 such 
as under-specification of regulatory terms and under-enforcement of 
regulations, would be exploited by companies to lower costs. Indeed, it may 
be more reasonable from an economic standpoint to exploit the slack, or even 
seek to lobby the regulator, rather than to amend the original behaviour for 
reducing regulatory costs. 101  In contrast to the under-specification, there 
would also be a problem of over-specification (i.e., over-inclusiveness).102 
Rather than failing to catch all forms of harmful conduct, over-inclusive 
 
 97.  These private enforcement tools based on private litigations, or public enforcement tools based 
on regulatory sanctions, will also largely deter companies’ irresponsible behaviour and thereby increase 
the corporate accountability. 
98.  See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 190 (2007).  
 99.  See id. at 194. 
 100.  John Armour & Jeffrey Gordon, Systematic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 48 (2014).  
 101.  For example, “exercise[ing] political influence to achieve a lower rate of regulatory tax” rather 
than seeking “innovation that reduces the social costs of one’s activities in accordance with regulatory 
strictures.” Id. at 38.  
     102.  See ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY 
AND PRACTICE 103-06 (1999). 
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regulation may interfere with legitimate activities. Moreover, as summarized 
by Parkinson, apart from the technical limitation, there are jurisdictional and 
politico-economic limitations on conventional regulation.103 For example, 
regulatory standards on the same activity can vary among different countries, 
especially between developed and developing countries. 104  It may be 
difficult for developing countries to raise their standards to match those in 
the developed countries, due to a concern that more stringent regulations will 
make them less attractive for inward investment. Another point worth 
mentioning is that nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and other 
parties who advocate for CSR may themselves be interested groups seeking 
rents through lobbying within the current legal, institutional framework with 
the aim of obtaining what may not be easily or cheaply able to obtain in the 
market.105 The new regulations, in the form of new CSR statutes, may be the 
products of their influence. 106  Therefore, whether the so-called CSR 
regulatory initiatives are genuinely in the interests of wider society may be 
taken with a pinch of salt, at least in some cases. 
The foregoing discussions in Section III demonstrate that in addition to 
the market forces, legal forces can also be used to tackle corporate 
irresponsibility. Affected parties may use innovative manners to hold 
companies accountable.107 However, it is not the purpose of this paper to 
encourage mandating CSR-related requirements or incorporating all of them 
into the mandatory legal system under the current neoliberal context where 
the emphasis is on deregulation.108 Rather, the discussion above shows the 
potential of traditional corporate responsibility, which was previously 
regarded as intrinsically voluntary, to be enforceable. As an already well-
 
     103.  See John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance: 
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. OF CORP. L. STUDIES 3, 29-31 (2003).  
     104.  Karin Buhmann, Corporate Social Responsibility in China: Current Issues and Their Relevance 
for Implementation of Law, 22 THE COPENHAGEN JOURNAL OF ASIAN STUDIES 77 (2005). (arguing that 
developing countries such as China may adopt a relatively low standard regulation for environmental and 
labour protection while some buyer companies may, due to ethical and moral reasons, choose to purchase 
products or services from the Chinese suppliers which comply with a higher standard according to 
international law or other applicable law). 
 105.  See Donald J. Kochan, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 413, 441 (2014). 
 106.  See id. at 436. 
 107.  Particularly for small and medium-sized companies who may not have a strong incentive to 
comply with voluntary CSR responsibilities—due to the limited reputational and financial gains from 
compliance, as suggested by Doreen McBarnet—legal mechanisms would become the only route for 
aggrieved parties to seek remedies against companies. 
 108.  G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World 
Order, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 71, 71 (2009); see also Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational 
Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 390 (2005); Mark T. 
Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 147, 155 (2017).  
2 - YAN _ZHANG - V9 - KC - 10.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  11:11 AM 
62 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:1 
established system, the law109 could facilitate the development of corporate 
responsibility as well as corporate accountability. 
Admittedly, it would be difficult to hold companies accountable beyond 
the law. Apart from the moral restraint and market forces, an innovative 
application of existing legal mechanisms, as explored above, proffers a 
potential solution. For example, companies’ CSR commitments can not only 
be viewed as a type of self-constraint from a social-legal perspective to 
reduce the externalities,110 but also as potentially controlled by competition 
law or contract law with a legal impact. 
It has been identified that enforcement based on private law has a 
structural role to play in the system of public regulation in that private 
litigations may fill some gaps left by the public enforcement regimes.111 The 
effectiveness of public or private enforcement may depend on their 
respective informational advantages in a particular setting. In some cases, 
employees and suppliers may have first-hand information due to their direct 
losses or harms caused by corporate irresponsibility. Therefore, private 
litigations brought by those parties may facilitate regulators to supervise 
certain activities of companies. Private enforcement mechanisms of CSR do 
not necessarily mean replacing voluntary mechanisms or public enforcement 
regimes; rather, the relationship between private enforcement mechanisms 
and public ones can be complementary. 
Corporate accountability could exist at the international level, however, 
as it is still under-developed, and there is no effective international 
enforcement court or mechanisms yet available.112 As a result, enforcement 
mechanisms, based on national law, seem to be attractive options at the time 
being.113 One may point out that private law, including contract law and tort 
law, are malleable materials, which can be used to adapt to new changes in 
social and economic contexts. If legislators believe that there is a strong 
social need to regulate CSR-related issues, formal regulation may be enacted 
and implemented either by public authorities or private parties. 
In practice, it may be difficult to draw a clear line between voluntary 
CSR enforcement, private enforcement, and public enforcement, as they may 
be intertwined. Depending on the degree of involvement of private parties 
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and the harshness of the regulation, the regulation can be categorised into 
self-regulation by private parties, hard law regulation by states, nonbinding 
soft law regulation (aiming to persuade corporates to do something), civil 
regulation where NGOs play an important role, and co-regulation where 
public and private work together to regulate a certain area or industry.114 
Many NGOs, administrative agencies, and private parties have already 
started to creatively enforce the voluntary CSR responsibilities basis on 
private law, including contract and tort law.115 After becoming shareholders, 
NGOs can influence companies’ internal governance through shareholder 
meetings and resolutions.116 In certain industries, self-regulation and public 
regulation are not easily separated as they may have a relationship of mutual 
influence or collaborative rulemaking.117 For example, public regulations 
may be made by public organisations while private agencies implement the 
supervision. Also, it is equally possible to have a process where both public 
and private parties are involved in regulation-making meetings.118 
Both the process and outcome of transposing corporate responsibility, 
which is intrinsically voluntary, to corporate accountability, which can be 
seen as legally implementable, is worth our attention. Some have argued that 
implementable substantive values and mechanisms should be the basis of the 
accountability regimes of corporate responsibility, while the process should 
be able to subject internal corporate governance to external stakeholders and 
their influences.119 Meanwhile, there is a need to maintain a balance between 
the accountability of companies and the efficiency of managers’ decision-
making.120 It is true that to assert that a high level of corporate accountability, 
especially in a case where directors need to consider a variety of stakeholders’ 
interests, may slow down the efficiency of decision-making and blur the 
focus of the management team. However, without implementable external 
monitoring from affected stakeholders, companies may not be responsible 
for their externalities. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Compared with corporate responsibility, which focuses on the 
introduction of rights and duties, corporate accountability focuses more on 
its implementation. The legal mechanisms discussed in this paper 
demonstrate the possibility of having a more enforceable framework to 
ensure corporate accountability and implement the corresponding rights and 
duties without any material changes to the current legal environment. 
Primary stakeholder groups, who are most likely to affect, or be affected by, 
corporate behaviour, can seek recourse through existing laws by 
innovatively seeking remedies in addition to traditional forms, such as 
boycotts or strikes. 
It is, however, important to bear in mind that no single mechanism is 
sufficient to tackle all accountability concerns alone, due to each having their 
own weakness and limitation. Holding companies accountable must include 
multiple layers of legal tools. At the same time, legal intervention does not 
necessarily make market forces redundant. For example, some legal 
mechanisms such as disclosure requirements under corporate law may in 
turn strengthen the market force in disciplining corporate behaviour by 
increasing transparency. 
From lawyers’ eyes, enforceability is itself an important topic. 
Responsibility as a duty to perform or refrain from performing would be 
inefficiently affected if it did not come with accountability for the failure of 
compliance. Discussing corporate social responsibility without an 
enforceable framework is less convincing, especially when the voluntary 
adoption or engagement of truly responsible behaviour is currently 
problematic. By shifting the focus from seeking the introduction of rights 
and duties to their effective implementation, this paper wishes to serve as a 
starting point of corporate accountability debate for future scholars interested 
in CSR topics. 
 
